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INTRODUCTION 
Bad boilerplate can shake one' s  faith i n  evolution; not only does it not 
die away, it multiplies. The puzzle is why. Much of boilerplate is ambigu­
ous or incomprehensible. This alienates consumers and is i ncreasingly 
punished by courts construing the language against the drafter. There 
must, therefore, be some hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate. The 
popular theory is trickery: drafters lure consumers in with promising lan­
guage that comes to nothing in court. But this trick would require 
consumers to do three things they do not do-read the language, under­
stand it, and take comfort in it. 
There is a hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate, but the trick lies in 
the courts, not the consumer. The trick is a private conversation between 
drafters and courts; excused from the table is the consumer, who could 
have no fair duty to understand, and so has no duty to read. With the con­
sumer out of the room, edits and additions to boilerplate are targeted to 
courts alone. The new language does not need to make sense to a layman. 
It does not even need to make sense standing alone; a judge will read the 
language in the context of precedent, with the aid of briefing. 
* Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law. -Ed. Thanks to David 
Bernstein, Lloyd Cohen, Ross Davies, Bruce Kobayashi, Kimberly Moore, Nicholas Quinn Rosenk­
ranz, Omri Ben-Shahar, Eugene Volokh, and the participants of this symposium for their insights. I 
am grateful to the George Mason Law and Economics Center for generous support. 
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Boilerplate, used widely, repeatedly, applied uniformly to all, is like a 
broad statute,1 or the First Amendment. 2 An innocent first reader is not on 
notice that the true meaning of the words is found in the case law. Drafters 
do not use this language to trick consumers, however, because they no 
longer care what consumers think of the language. Drafters value boilerplate 
because courts know what it means. 
This Article evaluates the continued abstruseness of boilerplate language 
despite incentives, j udicial and otherwise, for clarity. Several rules and pat­
terns of judicial interpretation aim for clarity, but perversely result in 
continuity. The linguistic community dwindles to the court and the drafter 
alone, cutting out the nondrafter, reader, or consumer. This drives drafters 
deeper and deeper into the arms of existing case law as a primary means of 
selecting clauses. The danger is that while some consumers may not read the 
contract, none will read the case law in which any particular tum of phrase 
is embedded. Precedents speak to the drafter, not to the reader. 
The problem is in fullest bloom in the insurance context. Insurers will 
cling for decades to language that courts continually declare ambiguous and 
construe against the insurer. Why, in the face of this history, insurers have 
chosen not to clarify the language, or to stop using it, courts "cannot con­
ceive of an answer.''3 What the court does not realize is that it has fired its 
last shot, and the insurer knows it. 
Any discussion of insurance law is by necessity a discussion of contract 
law. Some of the discoveries and conclusions of this piece apply equally 
well to ordinary contract law, or even serve as a warning about the future of 
consumer contract law. History suggests that where the subspecialty of in­
surance doctrine leads, ordinary contract doctrine may follow. Far from 
being the dull cousin of the contract family, insurance is the odd but brilliant 
prodigy. The law of insurance often deviates from basic contract law at pre­
cisely the point where insurance contracts typify the modem consumer 
contract-boilerplate clauses, little negotiation, written in legalese, and re­
ceived by the consumer only after the contract has begun. 
Insurance is of course more than j ust the ultimate consumer contract be­
cause insurance contracts have their own qualities. Nonetheless, if courts 
view consumer contracts as disreputable, they view insurance contracts as 
downright seedy. The result is that insurance law is often the crucible in 
which new legal approaches to protecting the consumer are formed; more 
aggressive applications of existing doctrine may arise in the insurance con­
text and return with new vigor when applied to other consumer contracts.4 
I. See, e. g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof . . . .  "U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
3. New Castle County, Del. v. Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 243 F.3d 744, 755 
(3d Cir. 200 I). 
4. The Arizona Supreme Court describes one such example: 
Artificial results derived from application of ordinary rules of contract construction to insur­
ance policies have made courts struggle to find some method of reaching a sensible resolution 
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Courts try to improve the language of insurance policies, as a parent 
tries to improve a child's behavior, both by punishment and by encourage­
ment. The frustration of courts in this endeavor suggests that they realize 
their efforts are being wasted. As stated by one court in 1970, and repeated 
by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in 1997: 
Ambiguity and incomprehensibility seem to be the favorite tools of the in­
surance trade in drafting policies. Most are a virtually impenetrable thicket 
of incomprehensible verbosity. It seems that insurers generally are attempt­
ing to convince the customer when selling the policy that everything is 
covered and convince the court when a claim is made that nothing is cov­
ered.5 
Given how rarely insurance policy language is read, even by sophisti­
cated commercial policyholders, who mostly rely on a broker's description, 
it seems unlikely that policy language is meant to convince would-be poli­
cyholders of broad coverage. In fact, one would expect that an attempt to 
lure in new policyholders with truly incomprehensible language would fail. 
Evidence supports the proposition advanced here, that the insurers' audience 
from start to finish is the courts, a practice that leaves policyholders by the 
wayside, and one that courts unwittingly encourage. 
The first perverse incentive is one courts cannot control, but it underlies 
the other three: the sheer act of having interpreted a clause in a way that 
allows for predictable application in the future adds value to that clause. 
With insurance, the value is great enough that this generally makes it more 
likely, not less, that drafters will retain poor language. With ordinary com­
mercial contracts, the value of certainty will sometimes outweigh a less than 
ideal clause content, and sometimes not. But where drafters-such as insur­
ers--care more that a clause have a fixed meaning than a particular 
meaning, path dependence can preclude otherwise desirable improvements 
in the language. 
Second, many courts have come to conclude that nondrafters cannot be 
required to read their contracts. If insurance language is unredeemable, for 
example, courts should simply protect the "reasonable expectations" of poli­
cyholders as to the scope of their coverage--confusing contrary policy 
within the conceptual bounds of treating standardized, formal contracts as if they were tradi­
tional "agreements," reached by bargaining between the parties. This difficult task is often 
accomplished by the use of various constructs which enable courts to reach a desired result by 
giving lip service to traditional contract rules. One of the most prominent of these methods is 
the well recognized principle of resolving ambiguities against the insurer [otherwise known as 
contra proferentem]. 
Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 394 (Ariz. 1984) (en 
bane). 
5. S.C. Ins. Co. v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 489 S.E.2d 200, 206 (S.C. 1997) 
(citing Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 45 l S.W.2d 616, 622-23 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1970)) (attempting to navigate the application of other insurance clauses in order to determine how 
much is owed by each insurer). The South Carolina court also notes that while courts tum "confi­
dently to tried and true principles of contract law," they tum in vain, for judges have "failed utterly 
to anticipate the linguistic excesses to which the insurance industry would resort in order to avoid 
paying claims." Id. at 2 10- 1 1. 
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language notwithstanding. 6 The carrot of the "reasonable expectations" doc­
trine is that if insurers write clearly, the policyholder's contrary expectations 
will not be considered "reasonable." The message sent by courts is a mixed 
one, however. A state supreme court, for example, dismissed evidence of 
clearly contrary policy language due to the absence of proof that the policy­
holder had knowledge of the language.7 In other words, if the insurer could 
not prove the policyholder had read the language, the language could not 
control the policyholder. As more courts flirt with this approach in the ordi­
nary contract realm, its potential effect deepens. 
Third, courts are trapping themselves in a sticky combination of contra 
proferentem, a consensus approach to finding ambiguity, and what will be 
called here the adverse possession of language. Contra proferentem is meant 
to give drafters an incentive to draft cleanly, by construing ambiguous lan­
guage against the drafter, in favor of coverage. In first determining whether 
the language is ambiguous, "some courts hold that a difference of opinion 
among courts of various j urisdictions establishes conclusively that a particu­
lar clause is ambiguous, while others hold that it merely constitutes 
evidence of ambiguity." 8 These latter courts view a split among other j uris­
dictions as "a factor to be considered in determining the existence of 
ambiguity." 9 As more courts adopt this approach of follow the leader, na­
tional drafters can more easily anticipate how the language will be 
interpreted, even in j urisdictions where the clause has not yet been litigated. 
The value of the clause thus goes up, not down. 10 
6. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW§ 6.3 ( 1 988). 
7. C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 1 69, 1 76 (Iowa 1975) (en bane). 
8. Hartford Accident. & lndem. Co. v. Dana Corp., 690 N.E.2d 285, 295 (Ind. App. 1 997) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) ("We conclude that the division of authority on this issue is 
instructive and is evidence that more than one reasonable interpretation . . .  is possible."). This con­
cept was confirmed in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Summit Corp. of America, 7 1 5  N.E.2d 926, 938 
(Ind. App. 1 999) and American Home Assurance Co. v. Allen, 8 1 4  N.E.2d 662, 668 n.4 (Ind. App. 
2004), in which the court noted: "Even if we were to find that the terms 'related' and 'interrelated' 
had the same meaning, we observe that division of authority on an issue is instructive and is evi­
dence that more than one reasonable interpretation of a term is possible." Id. (emphasis added); see 
also Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 394 (Ariz. 1 984) (en 
bane). 
9. Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 6 1 7, 624 (Md. 1 995) ("[I]f other judges have held 
alternative interpretations of the same language to be reasonable, that certainly lends some credence 
to the proposition that the language is ambiguous and must be resolved against the drafter."); see 
also Lefrak Org., Inc. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 942 F. Supp. 949, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[T]he 
range and variety of judicial opinions bolsters the conclusion that the pollution exclusion . . .  is 
ambiguous."), quoted approvingly by Peace v. Nw. Nat'! Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 429, 454 (Wis. 1 999); 
Fight Against Coercive Tactics Network, Inc. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1 426, 1433 (D. Colo. 
1 996) ("That different courts have arrived at conflicting interpretations of similar clauses in other 
policies is indicative of the Policy's ambiguity."); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. DeBruicker, 838 F. Supp. 
2 15, 22 1 (E.D. Pa. 1 993) ("The fact that courts differ on the meaning of a particular term in a par­
ticular context is evidence that the term is indeed ambiguous."). 
1 0. As always, this is not true for clauses where the adverse interpretation is one the insurer 
cannot bear actuarially. For one such example, the insurance industry's response to the risk of terror­
ism coverage, see Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 
93 GEO. L.J. 783 (2005). 
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The problem is compounded by the more than legitimate position courts 
take when organizations, including insurers, continue to use language that 
causes years of confusion and costly litigation; at some point the "hostile, 
open, and notorious" use of such difficult language causes it to be "ad­
versely possessed" by the courts.11 In short, the user is on notice that courts 
will construe the language against him. Even those jurisdictions that have 
not yet ruled on the language, and so do not independently find the language 
ambiguous, will join other courts in construing the language in favor of the 
nondrafter. The result, yet again, is that the language has a settled mean­
ing-not necessarily found in a natural reading of the clause-that is 
retained, just where the evidence demands redrafting.12 
This Article first examines how the drafting process creates a feedback 
loop that makes existing language more valuable over time. The network 
effects and path dependency of shared language are more forceful in insur­
ance than ordinary contract drafting, yet this Article is the first contribution 
to the subject. Next, the bulk of the Article establishes and analyzes three 
ways in which courts counterintuitively reinforce the retention of unclear 
language through the application of interpretative principles. Finally, while 
the discussion of these perverse incentives is novel, the Conclusion consid­
ers some rather obvious solutions. 
I. THE BIRTH OF BOILERPLATE 
The infiltration of lawyers in commercial contract drafting, at least in 
the United States, has led to more than language recycled by a single entity, 
it has led to communal boilerplate-fixed language that is common to an 
industry, or across industries. 13 The more widely boilerplate spreads, the 
more it comes to resemble a public statute instead of a private agreement. 
This, in tum, leads to the common law of common boilerplate. 
Corbin drew a distinction between the interpretation and the construc­
tion of contracts.14 An interpretation of contractual language seeks to find 
the parties' meaning. A construction of the language determines the legally 
binding meaning, which could bear a number of different relations to the 
1 1 . BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (8th ed. 2004) ("adverse possession"); see also 2 C.J.S. 
Adverse Possession § 29 (2003). The analogy is inverted because it is the drafter openly and notori­
ously using the language, but the courts that come to claim possession of it. Purists can base the 
adverse possession claim in the courts' hostile, open, and notorious interpretation of the language. 
1 2. There is a fifth twist, not examined here, that distorts insurance drafting. In a parallel to 
statutory interpretation, courts tum on occasion to the drafting and regulatory history of insurance 
clauses. This history includes internal ISO documents, published bulletins, and representations to 
state insurance commissioners about the scope and meaning of new clauses. This history is only 
used if it adds to or changes a court's interpretation, that is, only if it provides meaning not readily 
accessible in the clause itself. The private conversation between courts and insurers continues. 
1 3. Farnsworth defines "boilerplate" as "standard clauses lifted from other agreements on 
file or in form books." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 7. 1 ,  at 426 (3d ed. 1 999). 
1 4. See 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 534 ( 1 960); see also Arthur L. 
Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 740-4 1 (191 9). 
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interpretation. With boilerplate, there is very little, if any, interpretation; all 
that is left to the court is construction. 
Construing boilerplate rather than interpreting it is sensible. First, given 
that only one party-the drafter-may have read the language before sign­
ing, or even before litigation, a court is unlikely to find an actual joint 
meaning. Second, boilerplate clauses seem to make up a disproportionate 
percentage of those clauses courts are unwilling to enforce, even if, or per­
haps because, their meaning is clear. This is of course one of the main paths 
by which construction will diverge from interpretation. Third, similar or 
identical boilerplate language may have already been interpreted by the 
court at hand or by other courts. In other words, the legal meaning of boiler­
plate-its construction-may already be known, making any foray into its 
subjective interpretation less desirable. 
Moreover, the accumulative process by which boilerplate comes to be 
boilerplate, discussed in detail below, often leads to language a layman will 
not understand. At this point, many courts will lose all interest in the project 
of interpretation, if defined as seeking the meaning the parties ascribe to the 
language. And who can blame them? The nondrafter either will have as­
cribed no meaning to the inchoate language or will have been misled or 
confused by it. Given that a court cannot simply refuse to address the case in 
the absence of meaningful interpretation, it is left with construction. 
Once it is accepted that boilerplate is not necessarily the will of the par­
ties, interpretation can be given up in exchange for other values. Contra 
proferentem15 attempts to value fairness and future clarity, and, in the insur­
ance context, the "reasonable expectations" of the policyholder. It has 
therefore been written of contra proferentem that while "it can scarcely be 
said to be designed to ascertain the meanings attached by the parties," at 
least the "rule may encourage care in the drafting of contracts."16 This Arti­
cle suggests otherwise. 
The value of uniform interpretation for the same clause across parties 
mimics the application of statutory law. Under the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 211(2), "standardized agreements" are "interpreted wherever 
reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situated, without regard to 
their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the writing."17 
This rule "subordinates the meaning that an individual party may have at­
tached to the contract language to the goal of equality of treatment for 
parties that are similarly situated."18 In other words, the language is treated 
1 5. Contra proferentem as a concept comes first from noninsurance contract law and is de­
scribed in varying ways. The Supreme Court, applying it in a construction case, referred to "the 
general maxim that a contract should be construed most strongly against the drafter." United States 
v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 2 1 0  ( 1970). As early as 1923, the Court had applied the rule in the in­
surance context. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 1 67, 1 74 ( 1 923) ("The 
rule is settled that in case of ambiguity that construction of the policy will be adopted which is most 
favorable to the insured."); see also infra note 64. 
1 6. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1 3, § 7. 1 1 , at 474. 
1 7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 2 1 1 (2) ( 1 98 1 ). 
1 8. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1 3, § 7. 1 1 , at 474. 
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not as a private agreement, but as a public statute, with one meaning applied 
to all.19 
This approach to the unfortunate aspects of boilerplate can be self­
perpetuating. Boilerplate that has repeatedly been construed by courts will 
take on a set, common meaning, but one that may not be easily understood 
by reading the language itself.2° As with judicial interpretation of broad stat­
utes ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."),2 1 or constitutional provi­
sions ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech."),2 2 the meaning ascribed to the language by an innocent first reader 
will differ markedly from the meaning the language is given in court, the 
meaning upon which drafters rely.2 3 With contract clauses, as with such stat­
utes, an outside reader may have an illusion of understanding, but only 
knowledge of the subsequent case law and regulatory actions can reveal 
what the language means in the eyes of the law. 
For the first nondrafter or consumer before the court, the application of 
contra proferentem is a boon, assuming that the drafter's interpretation was 
rejected by the court in part to protect the consumer. But if the court's con­
struction of the language is acceptable to the drafter, it will be used in the 
future, to the disadvantage of consumers two through two million, who will 
not understand the language or who will be misled by it into not seeking 
relief a court would grant. In short, the language takes on a private meaning, 
not between the two parties to the contract, but between the courts and the 
sophisticated drafter. 
Of all contracts, the insurance policy is the poster child for the down­
sides of boilerplate. Yet the doctrine and interpretive approaches applied to 
insurance are more strict or more consistently applied versions of those ap­
plied to other contracts. The assumption has been that courts are stricter 
with insurance contracts because insurers are incorrigibly bad drafters. It is 
worth asking if there is not some reverse causation; insurers have become 
the drafters they are under this stricter interpretive regime. 
1 9. See, e. g., Carroll v. Littleford, 1 70 S.E.2d 402, 405 (Ga. 1 966) ("[T]he construction 
placed . . .  upon similar contracts will control."). 
20. Boilerplate language that has a meaning apparent to drafter and nondrafter alike, and that 
a court is willing to enforce, does not concern us here. 
2 1 .  E.g. , Sherman Act, 15  U.S.C. § l (2000). 
22. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
23. Drafters do not have to be in litigation to rely on the courts' interpretation, of course. The 
initial payment offer and later negotiating positions are based on the actor's perception of what 
would happen if the parties were to litigate. 
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II. THE FEEDBACK LOOP JN POLICY DRAFTING 
Positive network effects can flow from common or boilerplate clauses in 
any contract.24 Widespread, shared contract language is more likely to have 
taken on a lay meaning,2 5 and to have been previously interpreted, perhaps 
definitively, by courts.2 6 If courts have fleshed out the application of lan­
guage, a drafter can be confident about its future application. The value of 
contract language can therefore increase as the number of others adopting 
the language increases. 
Interestingly, this is not a "true" or traditional network effect.2 7 The 
value of a network effect in contract language may be one that, once 
achieved, is permanent, and no longer rests on the number of other users. By 
contrast, in order for the phone line running into your house to be valuable, 
there must be others on the network; the fact that others were once on the 
network is of less use than an eight-track player. Moreover, in this tradi­
tional network effect, the value of the network increases with the addition of 
each new member, assuming the absence of network overload. The added 
value of a network of contracts with the same clause may increase with each 
new member, but only up to a certain point, after which additional members 
neither add nor detract from the value.2 8 
This imprecise fit between true network effects and the synergy or ge­
stalt effects2 9 of widespread contract language may explain the limited 
network analysis in the contract literature.30 It cannot explain the inattention 
in the insurance context, however, where both true network and gestalt ef­
fects are strong. The combined strength of the effects is more than additive, 
it is mutually reinforcing. 
24. This point is not new, of course. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization 
and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate"'), 83 VA. L. REV. 7 1 3  
( 1 997); Michael Klausner, Corporations. Corporate Law. and Networks of Contracts, 8 1  VA. L. 
REV. 757 ( 1995). The near absence of a discussion of network effects in the insurance contract is 
startling, however. One of the best early articles about network effects in the law does at least briefly 
mention insurance. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 587 ( 1 998). 
25. The lay meaning may not conform to the meaning given by courts, of course, which is a 
severe problem addressed below. 
26. See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychologi­
cal Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 5 1  VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1 594-95 ( 1 998). 
27. See generally Lemley & McGowan, supra note 24; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Mar­
golis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. EcoN. PERSP., Spring 1 994, at 1 33, 1 35; 
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 79, I IO (200 1 ); Howard A. Shelanski & 1. Gregory Sidak, A ntitrust Divestiture in 
Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 ,  5 (200 1). 
28. With traditional network effects, the counterpart. to this point is sometimes referred to as 
critical mass: the point at which the value of joining the network exceeds the cost because of the 
positive externalities generated by those already on the network. 
29. These effects are "gestalt" in the sense that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
30. For an excellent exception, see Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in "Legalese", 
77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (200 1 ). 
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A brief primer on insurance drafting: The primary organization in charge 
of the drafting process is the Insurance Services Office, or IS0.31 ISO copy­
rights standard policy forms and sells access to them. In addition to drafting, 
ISO submits proposed language to state insurance commissioners and works 
with the commissioners, sometimes collectively, until the language is ap­
proved for use.32 As loss data on the language comes back, and as courts 
interpret the language, ISO may start the cycle again with redrafting.33 The 
result, says ISO, is that consumers "benefit from the clarity that the standard 
coverage language achieves."34 
It should be questioned both whether language does indeed evolve from 
less to more clear and who benefits from the language changes that are 
made. ISO boasts that it "monitors changes in the insurance industry and in 
the law," and then "drafts language necessary to address new laws, court 
interpretations of coverage forms, or changed market conditions."35 But re­
drafts often carry the baggage of their past with them, so that for the 
cognoscenti, the language has contextualized meaning. This richer meaning 
is a form of greater clarity for courts and for insurers, but not necessarily for 
policyholders. 
Courts and academics are overlooking the fundamental ways in which 
insurance drafting differs from ordinary contract drafting, even sophisticated 
commercial drafting. The structure of collective drafting and data pooling 
creates network effects and path dependence. The system is inherently self­
reinforcing, but the strength of the reinforcement depends on the value of 
known language relative to the value of redrafted language. Doctrines of 
3 1 .  ISO formed in 1971  through the merger of similar entities for stock insurance companies 
(the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, later the Insurance Rating Bureau) and mutual in­
surance companies (the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau), both of which had been drafting policy 
language for the entire industry since the early 1 940s. ISO bills itself as "the property/casualty in­
surance industry's leading supplier of statistical, actuarial, underwriting, and claims data." ISO 
Home Page, http://www.iso.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). ISO should not be confused with ISO, 
the International Organization for Standardization. See Int'! Org. for Standardization Home Page, 
http://www.iso.org (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
32. The role of insurance commissioners is significant: 
States have the principal regulatory authority over the primary insurance companies [and e]ach 
state has an insurance official who has two primary areas of responsibility: (I) monitoring and 
overseeing the financial solvency of the insurers, and (2) examining insurers' rates and market 
practices. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), through its advisory 
recommendations, plays a key role in state regulators' efforts to coordinate and strengthen 
their oversight of the insurance industry. 
PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 9 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr. eds., 1 998) (citation omitted). 
33. Standardized policies do include "manuscript" terms, terms that are drafted for a particu­
lar policy. Even here, however, any given manuscript term is likely based on a common form of that 
term. The existence of a manuscript term may indicate more individualized bargaining over that 
particular term, such that negotiation history might prove useful, but it does not necessarily make 
interpretation of the term any less "public" than standard ISO terms. 
34. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., ISO: ENHANCING COMPETITION IN THE WORLD'S INSURANCE 
MARKETS ( 1 999), reprinted in KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 33 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
35. ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 34. 
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interpretation that increase the value of known language or increase the risk 
of new language strengthen the loop. 
In the ordinary contract setting, Kahan and Klausner reserve the term 
"network benefits" for those externalities that are dependent upon an exist­
ing network but not a past network, and use "learning benefits" for those 
externalities that are dependent upon the past common use but not a future 
one. 36 Learning benefits in ordinary contracts can stem from language that 
has become familiar through use, whether or not the language continues to 
be popular.37 Just so in insurance, but the learning carries more weight in 
two ways. 
First, whether wisdom or paranoia, insurers assume that new language 
will be systematically construed against their interests. The value of "learn­
ing," therefore, is higher relative to the dim alternative for insurers. Second, 
insurers are learning on two fronts. In addition to the language taking on a 
shared industry meaning, it takes on judicial meaning, and then actuarial 
meaning. 
Note that the network value of judicial knowledge is separate from that 
of actuarial knowledge. There is a value to many insurers being on the same 
"language network," in that the language will more quickly be interpreted 
by each jurisdiction, and without most insurers having to engage in litiga­
tion. As with statutes, but unlike many contracts, a court's interpretation of 
policy language holds for all those "governed" by the language. "The inter­
pretation of policy terms is generalized beyond the claims of a single 
insured to the entire market for that policy."38 This is a direct network effect 
until the terms are well settled, and then it becomes a learning benefit, in 
that others do not need to continue using the language going forward. 
The value of actuarial data, by contrast, includes an ongoing network ef­
fect, which would be lost if others dropped off the chain. The size, scope, 
and frequency of losses change over time; without the ability to continually 
pool loss data with others hooked into the same network, past actuarial data 
loses its value. Insurers find themselves locked into existing language be­
cause they must stay in the feedback loop to retain that value. Without the 
collective endeavor, the rating services (i.e., price setting) of ISO become 
useless. 
Of course, the collective gain from pooling loss data can be had with 
new language. The value of new language is enhanced by the network bene­
fit of collecting actuarial data, even if the learning benefit of court 
interpretation has yet to be reached. However, until the language has been 
interpreted, the actuarial data will have limited value; the question is not 
simply how many fires there are in a year, for example, but how many are 
36. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 24, at 7 1 8. 
37. Of course, there may be some level of "maintenance" use that is required to sustain the 
learning benefit. 
38. John Randolph Prince, Ill, Where No Minds Meet: Insurance Policy Interpretation and 
the Use of Drafting History, 1 8  VT. L. REv. 409, 4 1 3  ( 1 994). 
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covered and to what amount-information that comes only from the interac­
tion of fire facts with courts' interpretation of fire language. 39 
As a result, insurers will retain language that is unclear to policyholders 
as long as it has become clear to courts, even if the courts' interpretation 
differs from the insurer's original meaning. For example, consider a policy 
that covers a policyholder's "property damage," defined as "physical injury 
to tangible property . . .  or loss of use of tangible property that is not physi­
cally injured."40 When the policyholder's computers crash, destroying 
valuable electronic data, is there coverage?41 Courts are currently struggling 
with whether electronically stored data is tangible property and whether the 
loss of data is property damage. 42 
Although large sums of money are at stake in the initial decisions, pro­
spectively the answer doesn't much matter. Either computer files are 
property, in which case insurers can include the risk in the premium, or files 
aren't  property, in which case insurers will exclude the risk from the pre­
mium. Similarly, although with more difficulty, if electronic data is 
"tangible property" according to case law, insurers can rewrite the definition 
of "property" or explicitly exclude electronic data from coverage, perhaps 
selling separate electronic coverage. Once the language has been given 
meaning by the courts, even if it continues to confuse policyholders, the 
insurer's path is set. 
It should be noted that although insurers may be indifferent, something 
is lost when restricted coverage is interpreted more expansively. In extreme 
cases, insurers will find the expanded coverage untenable and drop the area 
of coverage altogether. Policyholders might prefer a world in which they can 
choose between buying ordinary property coverage, or, for more money, 
adding electronic property coverage. If, on the other hand, policyholders 
always assume that electronic data will be covered, courts may be right that 
these expectations can be met only by preventing insurers from selling the 
lesser coverage. 
39. On the other hand, it might be that insurers experience a strong learning benefit from 
judicial and actuarial experience, but not the usual benefit of a shared understanding between the 
contracting parties themselves. If this Article is correct that insurers either choose or are trained to 
ignore the policyholder when drafting, then shared understanding between the two contracting par­
ties is unlikely and insignificant. 
40. Catherine L. Rivard & Michael A. Rossi, Expert Commentary: ls Computer Data "Tan­
gible Property" or Subject to "Physical Loss or Damage"?-Part 1, INT'L RISK MGMT INST., Aug. 
200 I, http://www.irrni.com/irrnicorn/expert/articles/200 l /rossi08.aspx (describing the standard 
Commercial General Liability policy definition of "property damage"). 
4 1 .  For a thorough analysis of the options under different policies and clauses, see Robert H. 
Jerry, II & Michele L. Mekel, Cybercoverage for Cyber-Risks: An Overview of Insurers' Responses 
to the Perils of £-Commerce, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 7 (2001). 
42. For two of the best opinions on each side, compare Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury 
Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 2003) (under Virginia law, computer data not covered because not 
tangible property), with Centennial Ins. Co. v. Applied Health Care Sys., Inc., 7 10 F.2d 1 288 (7th 
Cir. 1 983) (under California law, insurer had a duty to defend a computer hardware and software 
policyholder for loss of computer data). 
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With or without this loss of choice, there are thus several types of path 
dependence to the interpretation of a boilerplate clause. 4 3 Once the meaning 
of a clause has been clarified, enlarged, and applied by a court, its value in­
creases, at least for the drafter. The drafter can communicate, to courts, if 
not to policyholders, 4 4  in one clause what it has taken a court paragraphs­
or perhaps an entire opinion-to say. Goetz and Scott have described this, in 
the ordinary contract context, as the "quasi-Darwinian evolutionary process" 
that clauses must undergo in order to "become mature conventions whose 
risks and performance characteristics are known.', 4 5  
Of course, knowing precisely how courts will interpret a clause can 
regularly lead to rejecting it. On the other hand, the replacement for a 
dropped clause might not be a newly minted one, but an alteration to the 
original. The alteration may be crafted in direct response to court opinions, 
again leaving the nondrafter out of the loop. 
This type of "increasing returns" path dependence has not been applied 
to the insurance context, where it has real purchase; the force of path de­
pendence cuts deeper ruts with insurance than ordinary contracts because of 
the feedback loop of actuarial data. Not only does past language become 
clearer over time in the insurer's eyes, but the cost of each clause becomes 
increasingly clear as actuarial data is collected and pooled. Changing lan­
guage, even in an effort to decrease coverage, could be more costly. 4 6  
Insurance drafting thus creates more than a set path: it creates a Mobius 
strip of language reinforcement. Insurers can check out anytime they like, 
but they can never leave. 4 7 
As traditional path dependence teaches, the cost of shifting paths once 
the journey has begun may be prohibitive unless the value of the alternative 
path is higher than the collective switching cost. Insurers may be engaging 
43. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IowA L. REV. 601 (2001). 
44. These differences are analogical to private and state-supplied contractual terms. See 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions 
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 ( 1 985). 
45. Id. at 278. According to Goetz and Scott: 
A ... critically important benefit of standardized formulations is the reliability that results 
from the process of 'recognition.' A term is recognized when it is identified through adjudica­
tion or statutory interpretation and blessed with an official meaning. Informal or 'unofficial' 
customary term5 may be well-tested and clearly communicative between parties to the transac­
tion and nonetheless be subject to the prospect of misinterpretation by the state. 
Id. at 288. 
46. Even if insurers could write so clearly that policyholders and insurers had a shared un­
derstanding of the language, an omniscient court could not remove the risk of interpreting the 
language in new, unexpected contexts. New circumstances arise that neither party anticipated but 
that existing policy language might cover. No amount of careful drafting can answer these questions 
in advance, although redrafting as facts gradually change could. For example, why did insurers not 
write language anticipating the loss of computer data by the 1 980s, if not much earlier? This Article 
provides a partial answer. 
47. With apologies to THE EAGLES, Hotel California, on HOTEL CALIFORNIA (Elek­
tra/Asylum Records 1976). 
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in status quo bias here, but that can be saved for later. 48 Even without such 
bias, it would be accurate for insurers to realize that there are large costs 
incurred in organizing the industry through groups like ISO, reaching 
agreement on new language, implementing the language in future policies, 
and educating policyholders about the change. Abandoning the value of a 
known interpretation should be added to these costs. 
III. PERVERSE I NCENTIVES 
The pitfalls of communal drafting are most dramatic with insurance­
specific examples, although much of the analysis holds true in a less striking 
form for all boilerplate. Courts seemingly fail to see how their directives 
interact with the structure of the insurance-drafting process in particular and 
the choice of boilerplate in general. As a result, courts either fail to see the 
weakness of interpretive incentives, or they actively provide incentives to 
retain murky language. Three of these missteps are identified and explored 
here. 
A. An Interpreted Clause ls a Good Clause 
As the path-dependency discussion reveals, an interpreted clause is a 
valuable, predictable clause. With a settled contract term in the hand, even 
well-drafted new language is in the bush, because "the change itself weak­
ens the relevance of the existing stock of dispute-resolving conventions that 
the traditional language invoked."49 Ordinary contract drafters thus become 
attached to clauses that both parties can agree upon and that consistently 
convey the intended meaning to the court. 
With insurance, however, every settled clause has value. 5 °  First, a clause 
that confuses or misleads policyholders can still serve an insurer's purpose 
if courts understand it. This is possible because a side effect of collective 
drafting is the lack of competition on policy language. As a former president 
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, or NAIC, testi­
fied, 5 1  standard clauses are 
very carefully drawn by the best people in the industry and widely dis­
seminated and understood and expected and desired and needed by the 
insurance industry to mean the same thing regardless of who issues it, re­
gardless of whom he issues it to or where the claim arises or what the 
48. See Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for 
(Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425, 429-30 (2005). 
49. Goetz & Scott, supra note 44, at 30 1 .  
50. Well, almost every clause has value; those that require an insurer to provide coverage for 
a risk it deems uninsurable will be removed from future policies. A war exclusion that removed from 
coverage the losses of war, for example, would be changed or removed if courts consistently read it 
to require terrorism coverage. See Boardman, supra note 10. 
5 1 .  The NAIC is first and foremost the national group for the state insurance commission­
ers-the people responsible for regulating insurance in each state. Its connections with the industry 
are both incestuous and adversarial. 
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claim is, or when the claim arises and who asserts. The language means 
the same thing. 52 
If the language is the same, and is given the same meaning for all com­
ers by courts, there may be competition about which clauses are in each 
policy but not about the wording of those clauses. As a result, insurers don't 
have to compete by making clauses more accessible to policyholders-but 
only so long as all insurers use the same clause. 
The industry's position is that, "[w]ith most insurers offering policies 
based on standard ISO language, insurance consumers can readily compare 
their options, based on price, coverage, service. By contrast, if standardized 
coverages did not exist, consumers would face an unintelligible array of 
different insurance forms."53 This proposition needs to be tested empirically. 
In lines such as life insurance, insurers do not need to pool loss data because 
the data is straightforward and available without collaboration. Clauses and 
policies still tend to converge on similar language, and perhaps it is easier 
for policyholders to compare both price and substance where one basic risk 
is insured.54 
Whether insurers are right about policyholders' preferences for price 
competition over substance competition, collective drafting makes some 
forms of insurance possible. 
If each carrier's loss experience were derived from different policy lan­
guage, the statistics collected by the rating bureaus could never serve as the 
basis for loss prediction and rate-setting. Similarly, if individual carriers 
applied standard-form language differently, their loss experience data 
would be useless to the rating bureaus.55 
At the heart of this ability to pool individual insurer's data is the courts' 
willingness to grant standard policy language the universal power of a stat­
ute. 
A final way in which insurance drafting calcifies around a court's inter­
pretation, any interpretation, is the insurers' willingness to accept an adverse 
interpretation, changing premiums in lieu of changing the language. This is 
unlikely to be the case in ordinary contract drafting; if a term is consistently 
misinterpreted by courts, drafters will stop using the clause. But as with 
"property damage" to "electronic data," insurers may prefer a court's known 
interpretation to the insurer's original intended meaning. 
Given network effects, path dependence taking the actuarial loop, and 
the customary preference of insurers for certainty over substance, what's a 
52. In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Case, Jud. Council Coord. Proceeding No. 1072 (Cal. Su­
per.) (testimony of Richard E. Stewart, referring to Commercial General Liability policies), 
reprinted in John E. Heintz & Adrienne Danforth, Construing Standard Policy Language for the 
"Sophisticated Insured", 516 PLl/LIT 3 1 1 ,  317 ( 1994) (emphasis added). 
53. ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 33. 
54. In addition to insuring against the risk that an income-earner will die young, life insur­
ance policies commonly include an investment component. Investment options differ more widely 
but still allow for competition on both price and substance. 
55. Heintz & Danforth, supra note 52, at 3 1 8. 
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court to do? Unlike the next two contributions to calcified language, courts 
may be innocent parties in this debacle. The industry places great value, 
efficiently and not, on language that has been reliably interpreted by courts. 
The two obvious "fixes" are for courts to begin interpreting erratically or to 
refuse to interpret deficient language at all. Neither is tenable. Next best, 
understanding the self-reinforcing nature of insurance drafting might help 
relieve courts of the resentment that insurers willfully ignore their direc­
tives; in fact, insurers seem to deaf to all others. 
B. Drafters Will Write Only to Those Who Read 
The reasonable expectations doctrine belittles the role of the written 
contract, thereby encouraging drafters to ignore it. In some courts, the focus 
on reasonable expectations began as a limitation on the power of contra pro­
ferentem.56 If a term were ambiguous--open to more than one reasonable 
interpretation---courts would follow the proconsumer interpretation, but 
only if the result were within the consumer's reasonable expectation of the 
clause. In a strong minority of jurisdictions, this has been inverted in the 
insurance context; the reasonable expectations of the policyholder, as 
formed by life, can trump what would be a reasonable expectation formed 
from the policy language. 
One given purpose of the reasonable expectations doctrine is to create 
"incentives for insurers to clarify language."57 If only the language could be 
made clear enough, the contrary expectations of a policyholder would be 
deemed unreasonable. But in some jurisdictions the doctrine "applies to all 
insurance contracts" because "insurance policies are weighted with such a 
prolixity of complex verbiage that they would not be understood" and, if read, 
would present "an inexplicable riddle, a mere flood of darkness and confu­
sion."58 Here, the incentive fails because of the unrebuttable presumption 
56. The doctrine was first fully crafted by Robert E. Keeton in his seminal article, Robert E. 
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961  ( 1 970). 
Keeton recognized an existing judicial behavior and molded it into a single coherent theory, but the 
behavior he observed was not uniform at the time and has not become uniform since . Twenty six 
years later, there are too many articles addressing the doctrine in the insurance context to cite. See 
Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable 
Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (198 1 ); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 5 1  OHIO ST. L.J. 823 ( 1 990); Peter 
Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Ex­
pectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000); and the Fall 1 998 issue of the Connecticut Insurance 
Law Journal. 
57. John L. Romaker & Virgil B. Prieto, Expectations Lost: Bank of the West v. Superior 
Court Places the Fox in Charge of the Henhouse, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 83, 1 03 ( 1 992) (citing Keeton, 
supra note 56, at 968). 
58. Storms v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 388 A.2d 578, 579-80 (N.H. 1978) (quoting De Lancey 
v. Ins. Co., 52 N.H. 58 1 ,  588 ( 1 873)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Indeed, the court seems 
to think insurance scholars are engaged in a form of extreme scholarship. In its view, because insur­
ers are afraid: 
that, notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, some extremely eccentric person 
might attempt to examine and understand the meaning of the involved and intricate net in 
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that insurance language is unreadable; once the application of the doctrine is 
divorced entirely from the policy language, the insurer has no incentive to 
make it clear, as no level of clarity would help. 
For courts that take this position, the "duty to read" either does not arise 
or is a weak one.5 9  This is so for one or several reasons: the policyholder 
does not receive the actual language until after the policy has been issued;60 
the insurer knows the policyholder does not read the policy when he re­
ceives it and therefore cannot rely on his having read it; 61 or the policyholder 
could not, or does not, understand the language in those rare cases where it 
is read. In this last case, courts are unwilling to charge policyholders with a 
"duty to understand" the policy because it is not their fault that the policy is 
incomprehensible, and if there is no duty to understand the written words, it 
would be silly to enforce a duty to read. 
In its more extreme form, the doctrine allows courts to refuse to enforce 
policy language that is out of keeping with the policyholder's "reasonable 
expectations" of what the policy would cover, even if reading the policy 
would be sufficient to disabuse the policyholder of his expectation. As one 
state supreme court explained, "[i]f a policy is so constructed that a reason­
able man in the position of the insured would not attempt to read it, the 
insured's reasonable expectations will not be delimited by the policy lan­
guage, regardless of the clarity of one particular phrase among the Augean 
stable of print." 62 In this scenario, insurers will aim to make policy language 
clear to the judge who will interpret it, not to the policyholder who is ex­
cused from reading it. 63 
which he was to be entangled, it was printed in such small type, and in lines so long and 
crowded, that the perusal of it was made physically difficult, painful, and injurious. 
Id. at 580 (quoting De Lancey, 52 N.H. at 588). 
59. C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 1 69, 1 76 (Iowa 1 975) (en bane) 
("Nor can it be asserted the above doctrine [the reasonable expectations rule] does not apply here 
because plaintiff knew the policy contained the provision now complained of and [the plaintiff] 
cannot be heard to say it reasonably expected what it knew was not there. A search of the record 
discloses no such knowledge."). 
60. The policyholder commonly has a right to reject the contract for a brief period after 
receiving the policy. 
6 1 .  See, e.g., Estrin Constr. Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 6 1 2  S.W.2d 4 1 3  (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1 98 1  ). "In a contract of adhesion," including the insurance policy under discussion, "the terms 
are imposed by the proponent of the form: they are not expected to be read and even if read, the 
adherent has choice only to conform." Id. at 4 1 9  (citing CORBIN, supra note 14, § 559); see also 7 
SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 906B (3d 
ed. 1963). 
62. Storms, 388 A.2d at 580 (emphasis added) (finding that no policyholder could have a 
reasonable expectation of coverage after a policy had lapsed); cf Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. 
City of Keene, 898 F.2d 265, 270-72 ( 1 st Cir. 1 990) (applying New Hampshire law). 
63. In such cases, the courts seem concerned only with the representations of the insurer. But 
the policyholder makes representations too: that he understands the nature of the coverage being 
purchased. If the policyholder's expectations are wildly out of sync with the actuarial underpinnings 
of what the policy will pay out and what the policy must first take in by premium, perhaps the poli­
cyholder should be estopped from insisting on his view of coverage. Should IBM, for example, not 
be charged with having read its policy? 
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C. Contra Proferentem: Ambiguity by Consensus 
and the Adverse Possession of Language 
1121 
The doctrine of contra proferentem has an appealing principal ration­
ale. 6 4  As the party in control of the drafting process, "it is incumbent upon 
the dominant party to make terms clear."65 If the drafter fails in its charge, 
ambiguous language will be construed against the drafter, in keeping with 
the reader's reasonable expectations.66 This provides the drafter an incentive 
to improve the language and is only fair to the reader, who cannot affect 
standard-form language. In short, from power comes responsibility: "Con­
voluted or confusing terms are the problem of the insurer . . .  not the insured ,, 67 
Nicely turned out, but not true. Today, the ambiguity problem may be 
caused by the drafter, but it belongs to the consumer. The consumer is sad­
dled with the same confusing language time and again, despite the drafter's 
court-appointed duty. Courts-seemingly unaware of the private nature of 
their conversation with drafters, insurers in particular-are at wits' end. The 
Third Circuit was recently exasperated by a clause that "is widely used in 
insurance policies and has been the subject of heated litigation throughout 
the entire country over the past thirty years."68 The relevant clause reads: 
" ' Personal inj ury' means injury, other than 'bodily injury,' arising out of . . .  
In some jurisdictions, courts have decided that in order to maintain a uniform interpretation of 
identical policy language, the interpretation for sophisticated policyholders must match that for 
unsophisticated ones. Therefore, if an unsophisticated policyholder appears before a court first, the 
language in that jurisdiction will, for all, be based on the nonreading reasonable expectations. It 
would seem that insurers have an incentive to take their sophisticated policyholders to court first, in 
order to lock in a language-based interpretation, and exclude an expectations-based interpretation. 
64. Contra proferentem is a basic contract law principle, described in varying ways. See, e.g., 
1 1  SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 32: 12 ,  at 
476-8 1 (4th ed. 1 993 & Supp. 2005) ("Indeed, any contract of adhesion, a contract entered without 
any meaningful negotiation by a party with inferior bargaining power, is particularly susceptible to 
the rule that ambiguities will be construed against the drafter."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON­
TRACTS§ 206 ( 1 98 1 )  ("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a 
term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the 
words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds."); UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 4.6 ( 1994) ("If contract terms supplied by one party are unclear, an 
interpretation against that party is preferred."); see also 1 7A AM. JuR. 2D Contracts § 342 (2004) 
("An instrument uncertain as to its terms is to be most strongly construed against the party thereto 
who causes such uncertainty to exist, especially if he or she is the party who drew the contract or 
selected its language."). C.J .S. expands on the case of selecting language drafted by a third party: 
The language of a contract will be construed most strictly or strongly against the party respon­
sible for its use, whether that party or his or her representative chose the language or prepared 
the contract. A party is responsible for language used by his or her attorney in drafting a con­
tract [as well]. 
1 7  A C.J.S. Contracts § 337 (2003). 
65. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1 146, 1 150 (Del. 1 997). 
66. In insurance, the role of the policyholder's reasonable expectations varies with the juris­
diction. See Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 07 ( 1 998). 
67. Penn Mut. Life, 695 A.2d at 1 1 50. 
68. New Castle County, Del. v. Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 243 F.3d 744, 
7 4 7 (3d Cir. 200 I) (emphasis added). 
1 122 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104: 1 105 
[t]he wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of 
private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies by 
or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor."69 
As potential ambiguities spring to mind, bear in mind that in order to 
apply contra proferentem, the language must be ambiguous "as applied" to 
the factual case at hand. Here, the policyholder was a Delaware county that 
had quashed the plans of a developer, who then promptly sued for the taking 
of property without due process of law and for equal protection violations.70 
The county claimed that the insurer should provide coverage. 
The policyholder's first winning position was that "invasion of the right 
of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises" was ambiguous 
enough to allow a reasonable interpretation encompassing rezoning and 
building permit denial. The court's conclusion that the language was am­
biguous is supportable; the conclusion that the language was ambiguous as 
applied is not. 
1. Ambiguous by Consensus 
To support its conclusion, the Third Circuit relied on the fact that other 
courts had found the language ambiguous.7 1 Some courts explicitly state that 
insurers should be held to the interpretation most favorable to the policy­
holder where there are known splits because the insurer has failed in its job 
of rewriting language it knows causes confusion.72 Other courts hold more 
simply that such splits are evidence of ambiguity and resolve the ambiguity 
against the insurer.73 
A minority of courts has found "invasion of private right" ambiguous, a 
majority has found it unambiguously excludes regulatory decisions, and 
none has found it unambiguously includes regulatory decisions. From this, 
the Third Circuit, among others, concluded that the language must be am­
biguous. In an earlier case, the Third C ircuit had held that "[t]he mere fact 
that several . . .  courts have ruled in favor of a construction denying cover­
age, and several others have reached directly contrary conclusions, viewing 
69. Id. at 756--57 n. I (Scirica, J., dissenting) (quoting insurance policy). 
70. Id. at 747-48. 
7 1 .  Id. at 754-56. 
72. See 2 GEORGE J. COUCH ET AL., COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1 5 :83 (2d 
rev. ed. 1 984); see also Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[T]hat 
different courts have arrived at conflicting interpretations of the policy is strongly indicative of the 
policy's essential ambiguity."); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Summit Corp. of Am., 7 1 5  N.E.2d 926, 938 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1 999) ("This disagreement among the courts further indicates the ambiguity of the 
personal injury provisions."). One state supreme court has recognized that because it "follow[s] the 
rule of construction that where different jurisdictions reach different conclusions regarding the lan­
guage of an insurance contract 'ambiguity is established,' " it may be ''.justly criticized for accepting 
the inventions [of ambiguity] of other courts." Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters 
Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 394 (Ariz. 1 984) (en bane) (citation omitted). 
73. See New Castle County, 243 F.3d at 756 ("A single phrase, which insurance companies 
have consistently refused to define, and that has generated literally hundreds of lawsuits, with 
widely varying results, cannot, under our application of commonsense, be termed unambiguous."). 
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almost identical policy provisions, itself creates the inescapable conclusion 
that the provision in issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation," 
and is therefore ambiguous.74 
The perverse incentive of abdicating the ambiguity decision to other 
courts is apparent. It allows the ordinarily slow process of jurisdiction-by­
jurisdiction interpretation to snowball, increasing the predictive power of the 
language in less time. Moreover, following other jurisdictions on the ambi­
guity question might interfere with efficient competition between the 
states.75 State courts do not defer to the decisions of other state courts on the 
theory that, well, hell, they've already done the work. 
Finally, this follow-the-leader approach leads to awkward results once a 
jurisdiction has already ruled that particular language is not ambiguous, 
only to find a later split among the jurisdictions. Most courts will not reverse 
course because "conflicting interpretations from other jurisdictions do not 
create ambiguity where [the] courts have adopted a definitive interpretation 
under [that state's] law."76 The somewhat random result is that whether a 
term is considered ambiguous or not in a given jurisdiction may turn on the 
order of decisions. 
2. The Adverse Possession of Language 
The second winning position for the "takings" policyholder was that in­
surers were on notice that the language was unacceptable. "Insurance 
companies have included the clause . . .  for at least twenty years, and liti­
gants have repeatedly disputed the meaning of the term 'invasion of the right 
of private occupancy.' "77 Moreover, after decades of litigation, while courts 
74. Little, 836 F.2d at 796 (quoting Cohen v. Erie Indem. Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1 98 1 )  (emphasis added) ("[T]hat different courts have arrived at conflicting interpretations of the 
policy is strongly indicative of the policy's essential ambiguity."). The Third Circuit reaffirmed this 
concept in New Castle County, 243 F.3d at 754. Since Cohen, however, the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court has, in turn, embraced and abandoned this approach. See, e.g. , Lower Paxton Twp. v. U.S. Fid. 
& Guar. Co., 557 A.2d 393, 400--01 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1 989). There the court noted: 
Surely we would be abdicating our judicial role were we to decide such [ambiguity] cases by 
the purely mechanical process of searching the nation's courts to ascertain if there are conflict­
ing decisions. . . . [W]hether other courts have reached varying conclusions regarding the 
meaning of a policy is only relevant where the various meanings ascribed are reasonable. 
Id. The court then decided that the other courts "have ascribed an unreasonable meaning to an un­
ambiguous provision." Id. After this 1989 rejection of Cohen, a 1 98 1  case, a panel of the court 
reverted in 1 995, see Gamble Farm Inn, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 656 A.2d 142, 1 46 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1 995) ("More important than the actual holdings by other courts is the fact that their decisions dem­
onstrate the existence of an ambiguity in the crucial term . . . .  "), only to again reject the practice in 
1 996, see Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 678 A.2d 802, 807 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1 996) ("Rather than relying on the fact that jurisdictions are split over construing the provisions or 
that one jurisdictional line of reasoning is better than another, courts must remember to invoke the 
basic tenet of contract law and look to the writing itself first, before otherwise deciding a policy is 
ambiguous."). 
75. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common law: A Supply-Side 
Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 55 1  (2003). 
76. E.g. , Beretta, U.S.A., Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 1 1 7 F. Supp. 2d 489, 495 (D. Md. 2000). 
77. New Castle County, 243 F.3d at 755 (quoting lower court disposition). 
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have still not settled on a common meaning, insurers know that a decent 
percentage will find the language ambiguous. Given this, courts take the 
position that ongoing use of such open and notoriously difficult language 
will be declared "adversely possessed" by the courts; its meaning may once 
have belonged to the drafter, but now it is as the courts say.78 
As to why, in the face of this history, insurers had chosen not to clarify 
the language, or to stop using it, the court admitted that it "cannot conceive 
of an answer."7 9  What the court does not realize is that it has fired its last 
shot, and the insurer knows it. The threat of construing language against the 
insurer is mainly in the surprise; the insurer collected premium X but finds it 
owes coverage X + Y. The next year the insurer collects premium X + Y, or 
some calculation thereof, discounting (perhaps) for those policyholders who 
won't seek Y coverage from X language.80 One would think that this calcula­
tion would become complicated where one-third of the states choose X, 
one-third choose X + Y, and one-third has yet to rule. Courts are not the only 
ones stymied that insurers retain the language despite this morass, but con­
sider the insurer's options. 
In two-thirds of the jurisdictions, the language has a settled valuable 
meaning: X in one-third, X + Y in one-third. In the remaining one-third, 
insurers can guess that more than half will take the jurisdictional split as 
proof of ambiguity and find X + Y coverage. A settled meaning can there­
fore be expected in five-sixths of the jurisdictions. In any event, the insurer 
knows the exact application of the clause (for the disputed facts) in the great 
majority of jurisdictions; why would it redraft the language now? 
We might suspect that insurers would object to the untidy patchwork of 
interpretations. To get uniform results, the insurer has two options. First, it 
could introduce new language in every jurisdiction, but this opens it up to a 
whole new round of the game, without the current interpretation-security 
found in over two-thirds of cases. Second, it could introduce new language 
in the X + Y jurisdictions only, aiming to return to the category of X cover­
age. This choice only makes sense if uniform coverage from varied 
language is better than varied coverage from uniform language. 
Of course, this analysis leaves out a central incentive for insurers-the 
cost of litigation. Under the current regime, the insurer can handle claims 
and settlements in at least two-thirds of cases (assuming equal distribution 
of cases across jurisdictions) without much need for litigation, at least not 
language-based litigation. The insurer knows how courts will interpret the 
language without going to court again, and the policyholder, even if con­
fused about the language beforehand, can discover its meaning after the 
loss. If new language is introduced, however, even relatively clear language, 
78. See supra note 1 1 .  
79. New Castle County, 243 F.3d at 755. 
80. See infra text accompanying note 87, discussing unsophisticated or ill-advised policy­
holders who do not know to seek coverage because the policy language does not reveal that courts 
have found coverage. 
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it likely will be litigated in every jurisdiction until a settled meaning is 
found. This insurers do not want to do. 
Finally, some argue that contra proferentem should apply equally to un­
sophisticated and sophisticated parties, in order to maintain a uniform 
interpretation of the same policy language.81 As the Supreme Court of Wash­
ington reasoned: 
This standard form policy has been issued to big and small businesses 
throughout the state. Therefore it would be incongruous for the court to 
apply different rules of construction based on the policyholder because 
once the court construes the standard form coverage clause as a matter of 
law, the court's construction will bind policyholders throughout the state 
regardless of the size of their business.82 
This seems to mean that even if a policyholder could show good reason 
why it understood the language at hand to have a different meaning, and the 
specific insurer either shared that meaning at the time (contrary, let us as­
sume, to the drafters and the current precedent) or had reason to know of the 
policyholder's understanding yet did nothing to fix it, the court should re­
frain from enforcing the parties' joint intent. 
This may be one of the strangest aspects of the statutory nature of boi­
lerplate clauses; as with legislation, but unlike most contracts, a court's 
interpretation of policy language holds for all those "governed" by the lan­
guage. The industry seems to recognize the statutory nature of insurance 
clause interpretation: 
Court interpretations of standard coverage forms further assure consistent 
treatment of claimants. Once a court determines the meaning of a word, 
phrase, or clause in a standard coverage form, that interpretation has far 
more meaning and scope than if every insurer's policy form used different 
wording for the same idea.83 
What has escaped notice, and therefore scrutiny, is the fact that this ad­
ditional meaning is semi-private-the result of an ongoing conversation 
between insurers and courts-of which policyholders may be unaware. Of 
course, the meaning is public in that judicial opinions are public, but the 
public nature of Supreme Court opinions has not brought constitutional un­
derstanding to the streets. 
8 1 .  See, e.g. , Heintz & Danforth, supra note 52, at 3 1 4-- 1 5. 
82. Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 5 1 4  (Wash. 1 990) (en bane); see also 
Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440, 461  (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1992) ("The use of standard policy provisions is founded upon the premise that collaboration 
among casualty insurers is necessary to calculate and maintain reasonable rates . . . .  It would seem 
that the benefits of this standardization would be lost if standard form language were given different 
meanings for different insureds based upon individual degrees of sophistication and bargaining 
power."). 
83. ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 33-34 (emphasis added). 
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CONCLUSION :  ENDING THE PRIVATE CONVERSATION 
The ongoing debate about the potential efficiency of the common law 
raises a structurally similar question here. 84 Two agents are candidates for 
evolution in this context, with two potential spheres of efficiency. First, we 
might expect that over time the courts will develop increasingly efficient 
rules for the interpretation and application of boilerplate contracts, including 
insurance contracts. Without taking a position on the general trend, this Ar­
ticle reveals that courts are retaining various inefficient interpretive rules, 
the goals of which (language alteration) are counter to the incentive created 
(language perpetuation). 
Second, we might hope that as the courts' interpretation of contracts 
evolves, so would the contracts themselves. If the rules effectively blocked 
the benefits of misleading language, drafters would draft more direct lan­
guage. If the rules effectively punished drafters for sloppy language, they 
would allow less of it to pass once, and none of it to pass twice. Poor lan­
guage avoided is hard to show, and there are examples of helpful redrafts, 
but contracts do not seem to be swept along in the inexorable march toward 
clarity, brevity, and efficiency. 
There is a difference between missing the basket and making a foul: the 
lack of efficient evolution in interpretive rules is a missed opportunity, but 
more, the intentional pursuit of efficiency by courts has resulted in actively 
perverse incentives in the drafting of policies. 
The first outcome no doubt has many causes, but to the extent courts de­
fer to one another's ambiguity rulings, competitive evolutionary pressures 
are relieved. The second outcome-perverse incentives to retain poor lan­
guage-stems from the communal structure of boilerplate evolution, and the 
collaborative structure of the insurance market. This structure, while perhaps 
inevitable and perhaps desirable, limits competition on the policy front, 
shifting competition to price, package, and service. 8 5  The key, however, is 
knowing that the opinions should be read-knowing that a particular turn of 
phrase in a clause refers to the judicial interpretation of a prior clause. This 
sotto voce command to the courts can result in concealed meaning, or in 
language that Goetz and Scott call "encrusted." 8 6  
Notice that if the incentive given to insurers is to retain language that 
has increased in certainty value by interpretation, courts seem to assume that 
84. In chronological order, four highlights of the debate are: RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 320-28 ( ! st ed. 1 972) (opening shot); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. Pos­
NER, THE EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW ( 1987) (driving the point home); Gillian K. Hadfield, 
Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583 ( 1 992) (counter point); and Zywicki, supra 
note 75 (game, set, match). The fact that the evolution of common law has inefficiencies makes the 
law and economics approach to contracts more, not less, useful. See Richard Craswell, Jn That Case, 
What ls the Question ? Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory, 1 1 2 YALE L.J. 903 (2003). 
85. ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 33-38. 
86. Goetz & Scott, supra note 44, at 289. Clauses are "encrust[ed]" by "an overlaying of 
legal jargon to the point that the intelligibility of the language deteriorates significantly. Such boi­
lerplate weakens the communicative properties of preforrnulations, reducing their reliability as 
signals of what the parties really intend." Id. 
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all future policyholders will be helped nonetheless. Those that go to court 
will , and perhaps that is all some courts can see. The remaining policyhold­
ers are harmed. Those who do not sue because they do not read the hidden 
text into the unclear or misleading calcified language are not aided by the 
fact that, had they sued, coverage would be found. Moreover, these policy­
holders pay the increased premium for the judicially interpreted clause but 
only demand coverage for the clause as written.87 In short, the less sophisti­
cated the policyholder, the greater the risk of harm-again, an outcome 
opposite courts' intentions. 
This Article uncovers numerous difficulties but points to one fairly obvi­
ous solution: courts should be schooled in the nature of boilerplate creation, 
including insurance drafting, and be wary of creating perverse incentives to 
retain the very clauses they seek to change. As the trend in ordinary contract 
interpretation parallels more closely that already taken with insurance con­
tracts, courts should be aware of the consequences. 
Specifically, while the reasonable expectations doctrine has an estab­
lished place, its application should not be completely divorced from contract 
language, or drafters will likewise divorce themselves from improving the 
language. Moreover, compulsive application of contra proferentem to 
clauses that are not ambiguous, but rather simply disputed, can also belittle 
the role of language; to give drafters (and particularly, insurers) an incentive 
to fix language, language must carry weight with the court. 
As for insurers, one might wonder why the onus for change is not laid at 
their own feet. First, the thrust of this Article is that courts have one aim but 
unintentionally encourage another, often contrary, result. What is called for 
is a better understanding of the process, not a more illusive change in moti­
vation or appeal to the altruistic side of insurers. Second, to the extent 
insurers already have a motivation to improve poor language, that motiva­
tion might be unleashed if courts were to stop raising unnecessary hurdles. 
Ending inartful overapplication of the reasonable expectation doctrine, for 
example, could have substantial effect. 
Similarly, those who believe in the strong incentives of the market sys­
tem should be skeptical about what seems to be a failure of individual 
insurers to grab the low-hanging fruit. Of course, again, this Article argues 
that insurers are constrained by their collective endeavor in a way evident in 
few other industries. In addition, it is not obvious that insurers aren't rela­
tively content with the current system; the frustration of misconstrued 
language might be outweighed by the importance of predictable language. 
As long as insurers expect courts to systematically rule against them at 
every margin, insurers may value nothing so highly as the ability to nail 
courts down through precedent. 
Conversations with industry insiders suggest that the "insurance crowd" 
has internal rules about the way in which policies should be written, and 
perhaps this prevents the kind of innovative policy writing market forces 
87. See generally Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why In­
surance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 7 1  ( 1 995). 
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might predict.88 Insurers seem more comfortable with the old beat-up lan­
guage they know than the innovative clear language that one might expect 
would bring a market edge. It may well be true that in insurance, as in other 
areas of life, "it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed 
unconventionally."89 In other words, an insurance executive may be able to 
keep her job and steadily advance, all the while endorsing ISO-drafted lan­
guage that all other insurers are using, even if that language causes millions 
or billions of dollars in litigation. After all, it is industry standard to use ISO 
forms, not an individual decision for which the executive would be held ac­
countable. On the other hand, proposing that your company depart from 
industry language brings high risk with undervalued reward. 
It should be remembered, however, that there are real costs to breaking 
with the industry whole where the industry is otherwise cohesive. Whenever 
language is redrafted, removed, or newly introduced, the store of past actu­
arial data becomes either less relevant or useless. If all insurers embark on 
this new adventure together, not only can they pool the new actuarial data 
faster, but no one company will suffer relative to the others for the lan­
guage's failings. 90 If, however, an insurer strikes out on its own, this 
innovation brings the full cost of gathering actuarial data and the lonely 
danger of the language leading to unexpected liability. 
The industry that drafts together, sticks together, not just for future draft­
ing, but for the pooling of loss data that comes in on the first draft. From 
insurers, therefore, improvement will lie not in more individualized innova­
tion, but in more industrywide redrafting. What should be discarded in the 
end is not the standardized policy supported by mass actuarial data, but 
those interpretive rules that create perverse incentives to retain weak lan­
guage and create secret meaning. 
88. In THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, James Surowiecki attempts to explain the type of situation 
where competitors are all too cautious when they each have an incentive to buck the received wis­
dom. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004). 
89. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND 
MONEY 1 58 ( 1 936), quoted in Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate 
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 355-
56 ( 1 996). 
90. This is an inexact generalization, of course. Some insurers will sell policies with the new 
language more broadly than others, thereby bearing more risk should the language implode. Simi­
larly, based on their other risks and investments, insurers vary in their ability to take large losses. 
